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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
One evening in Paris, during the winter of 2008, Travis Kalanick and Garrett 
Camp experienced a dilemma that most people have experienced at least once in their lives: they 
were unable to hail a cab.1  It was in this moment that their story became unique, for Kalanick 
and Camp decided there should be an easier way for people all over the world to obtain 
transportation from point A to point B.2  In March of 2009, their dream became a reality when 
they founded UberCab, “a smartphone app that lets people tap a button and get a ride.”3  
In a little over nine years, the company now called Uber has operated  over 5 billion trips 
in 65 countries and over 600 cities around the globe.4  They have partnered with several different 
charities, provided jobs for the disabled and military veterans, established an UberPool option to 
help reduce carbon emissions, and have even begun to operate self-driving vehicles in certain 
cities.5  According to their website, they service 75 million riders, employ 3 million drivers, and 
complete about 15 million trips each day.6  Uber has become an enormous international company 
based on the premise of providing transportation whenever needed.7  The idea was simple, but 
the logistics of employing that many drivers to provide rides each day creates the potential for 
numerous complications.8  Camp and Kalanick’s creation massively improved modes of 
transportation for the world, yet also created a huge problem for consumers and their ability to 
sue Uber for any wrongdoings on the company’s part.  Most consumers are either not familiar 
with or do not fully understand what they are giving up when they enter into agreements that 
 
1 UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited May 15, 2019). 
2 See id.  
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited May 15, 2019). 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
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contain mandatory arbitration clauses.9  This note will focus on the pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses that Uber inserted into their terms and conditions and how this type of clause 
affects the average consumer.   
Two recent cases have tackled the issue of whether or not these arbitration clauses are 
conspicuous enough to be enforceable.  These cases created what initially appears to be a circuit 
split regarding the enforceability and conspicuousness of arbitration clauses that the average 
consumer confronts when they register for an Uber account.10  What remains unclear after these 
decisions is what is considered conspicuous enough to allow a consumer to waive their right to 
sue Uber in court and whether these cases actually created a circuit split.  The Uniform 
Commercial Code defines “conspicuous” to mean “with reference to a term . . . so written, 
displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have 
noticed it.11  Whether a term is "conspicuous" or not is a decision for the court.”12  In the context 
of smartphones, reasonable conspicuousness must be determined from the perspective of a 
reasonably prudent smartphone user.13  In Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit first decided in a class action that Uber’s app provided 
reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms of service as a matter of California law.14  In 
Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit created 
the “split” by ruling for the plaintiffs, holding that users of the ride-sharing service were not 
reasonably notified of the arbitration clause because the notice of the agreement was not 
 
9 Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study (2015), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf. 
10 See Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017); Cullinane v. Uber Techs., 893 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 
2018). 
11 U.C.C. § 1-201 
12 U.C.C. § 1-201 
13 6 David Bender, Computer Law § 61.05 (2018). 
14 Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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conspicuous within the meaning of Massachusetts’s law.15  Though the courts came to different 
decisions regarding whether the app’s interface was conspicuous enough to give the user notice 
of its terms and conditions, it is not certain that these courts would actually disagree with each 
other.  As discussed further below, the layout of the Uber app in each case was different for the 
users.16  The standard that the courts used to come to their holdings was essentially the same, but 
the cases dealt with slightly different facts that may have affected the outcomes in each case.  
These courts did not address the issue of whether or not mandatory arbitration clauses 
that are contained inside the agreements of streamlined and frequently used mobile apps such as 
Uber’s are fair to consumers.  In this note, I will analyze this issue that the First and Second 
circuits did not reach, as well as discuss the legislation that different states use to govern 
questions of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in a world that is relying more and more 
on technology in the daily lives of consumers.  I first begin this note with a general discussion of 
arbitration clauses and their use in web-based contracts.  I then move to an analysis of the circuit 
split between the First and Second Circuits.  Finally, I review consumer understanding of 
arbitration clauses and domestic and international legislation on arbitration and their advantages 
and disadvantages.  My discussion and analysis will show that even though states are attempting 
to strike a balance between the needs of consumers and the practicability of arbitration for 
corporations, the use of clickwraps and browsewraps in today’s technologically-dependent 
society places a significant burden on the average smartphone user by creating more streamlined 
contracts inside of apps that are used daily by consumers who have very little bargaining power.  
In addition to that, the increasing inequality of bargaining power demonstrates the need for a 
more evenhanded development of user agreements and use of arbitration clauses.  The complete 
 
15 Id. at 62. 
16 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 73; Cullinane., 893 F.3d at 62. 
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elimination of arbitration clauses in the Uber app is not realistic, nor is it practical, but Uber, and 
other similar companies need to be much more conspicuous and transparent about what rights 
consumers are waiving when they register.  These issues will only increase as smartphones find 
more ways to integrate themselves into our lives. 
 
PART II: ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Arbitration Clauses and Procedures 
The most common use for arbitration is to solve the problems of the tort system.17  
Generally speaking, parties involved in a dispute can agree after the fact to submit the dispute to 
a forum other than a court of law.18  Likewise, “parties to a contract can agree at the time of 
entering the contract to an alternative means of resolving” their disputes, if one were to arise 
between them in the future.19  “The most common form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
provided for in contracts is final and binding arbitration in which a privately-appointed 
individual – an arbitrator – is empowered to resolve claims that arise between the parties.”20  The 
American Arbitration Association’s boilerplate arbitration clause reads as follows: 
1.1 Arbitration of future disputes. 
(a) Scope, governing rules. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this 
Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be determined by final and binding arbitration 
administered by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") under its Commercial 
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures ("Commercial Rules") [including, if 
appropriate, [the Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes] [,/and] [the 
International Commercial Arbitration Supplementary Procedures] [and] [the 
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations]].21 
 
 
17 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIAL AND PROBLEMs (8th ed. 2018). 
18 CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 9. 
19 CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 9. 
20 CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 9. 
21 Clauses for the AAA, ICDR, ICC and UNCITRAL Arbitration, Practical Law Standard Clauses 6-502-3569. 
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“Arbitration provisions are now commonplace in consumer contracts.  Consumers can choose to 
pursue arbitration and waive their right to sue in court.”22  These clauses require the parties to 
settle their dispute in the presence of an arbitrator who acts as a judge, by reviewing both parties’ 
arguments and making a decision based on those arguments and all evidence presented.23  In the 
business context, these decisions are binding, and employers and various companies have 
included such clauses in contracts to prevent the costly and time-consuming process of 
litigation.24   
Some advantages of arbitration are “diminished complexity in fact-finding, lower costs, 
fairer results, greater access for smaller claims, and a reduced burden on the courts.”25 
Mandatory arbitration is not required to be included in contracts or in any setting by any state.26  
There are certain disadvantages to arbitration as well.27  These disadvantages mostly affect the 
consumer such as when lawyers increase the costs and duration of arbitration that can sometimes 
match litigation.28  Another disadvantage is the “repeat player” phenomenon.29  Repeat players 
are the institutions that engage in arbitration so regularly that they have a much higher victory 
rate than employees or consumers who have rarely if ever participated in arbitration.30  A study 
in employment arbitration cases “found that the odds are 5-1 against the employee in a repeat-
player case.”31  Analysts believe that this disadvantage “may be due to the ability and incentive 
 
22 Atalese v. U.S. Leg. Services Group, 99 A.3d 306, 309 (N.J. 2014). 
23 Arbitration, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/arbitration 
24 Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 848 (2010). 
25 FURROW, ET. AL, supra note 17.   
26 FURROW, ET. AL, supra note 17.  
27 FURROW, ET. AL, supra note 17. 
28 FURROW, ET. AL, supra note 17. 
29 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIAL AND PROBLEMs (8th ed. 2018). 
30 FURROW, ET. AL, supra note 17. 
31 FURROW, ET. AL, supra note 17. 
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of repeat players to track the predisposition of arbitrators and bias the selection process in their 
favor.”32    
In March of 2017, legislators introduced an amendment to  the Federal Arbitration Act.33  
This amendment, the Arbitration Fairness Act, aimed to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration clauses if 
one party tried to enforce the clause on another in an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil 
rights dispute.34  Congress found that while “the Federal Arbitration Act was intended to apply to 
disputes between commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power,” 
courts have extended its reach over the years through judicial interpretation to cover “consumer 
disputes and employment disputes, contrary to the intent of Congress.”35  Congress also found 
the following: “(1) most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice whether 
to submit their claims to arbitration, (2) consumers and employees are often not even aware that 
they have given up their rights, (3) pre-dispute mandatory arbitration undermines the 
development of public law because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial 
review of arbitrators' decisions, and (4) arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent 
to the arbitration is truly voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises”.36  This bill never passed.  
Thus, the unresolved concerns reflected in the congressional findings underscore the need for 
further reform to both federal law and state law as well.37   
While Congress began to question the role that mandatory arbitration clauses played in 
consumers’ lives, courts seemed to be moving in the opposite direction.  As one arbitration 
scholar has noted, “[d]espite paying homage to the role of consent in arbitration, United States 
 
32 FURROW, ET. AL, supra note 17. 
33 The Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 537, 115 th Cong. (2017). 
34 Senate Bill 537. 
35 Senate Bill 537. 
36 Senate Bill 537 (emphasis added). 
37 The Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 537, 115 th Cong. (2017). 
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courts over time have moved away from the traditional definition of waiver (intentional 
relinquishment of a known right) when the concept is applied to agreements for private 
resolution of otherwise justiciable disputes.”38  Indeed, the courts have redefined “consent” to 
mean “any evidence of an assent to arbitration,” regardless of whether the parties negotiate or 
even know about the arbitration clause, whether the clause covers the subject matter of the claim, 
and whether the clause is prohibited by state law.39  “The previously voluntary decision to trust 
one’s fate to [ADR] has morphed into a compulsory obligation, so long as the relevant 
counterparty inserts the magic word ‘arbitration’ somewhere into the contract.”40 
B. Web-Based Contracts 
One of the basic building blocks of contract law states that a contract is formed when 
there is a meeting of the minds and a manifestation of mutual assent.41  In order to have mutual 
assent, the parties to a contract need to have a fundamental “understanding of the terms to which 
they have agreed.”42  Acceptance of these terms can be as simple as an electronic ‘click’, 
provided that the layout and language of the website afford “the user reasonable notice that a 
click will manifest assent.”43  Contract formation via the internet “has not fundamentally 
changed the principles of contract law.”44  Given society’s technological advances, web-based 
contracts are a standard way for consumers to enter into agreements with producers.45  Not only 
 
38 Walter D. Kelley, Jr., “Mandatory Arbitration in the United States and Europe”, Hausfeld (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.hausfeld.com/news-press/mandatory-arbitration-in-the-united-state-and-europe?lang_id=1. 
39 Kelley, supra note 38. 
40 Kelley, supra note 38. 
41 Hines v. Overstock.com, 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
42 Atalese v. U.S. Leg. Services Group, 99 A.3d 306, 313 (N.J. 2014). 
43 6 David Bender, Computer Law § 61.05 (2018). 
44 Hines v. Overstock.com, 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
45 Id. at 366. 
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are they more commonplace, but the ease and speed with which these agreements are entered 
into are unparalleled when compared with more traditional written contracts.46  
Courts have clarified, however, that different types of web-based agreements may require 
varying level of assent in order for a contract to be valid.47  Clickwrap agreements require users 
to click an “I agree” box after being presented with the terms.48  Browsewrap agreements 
generally post terms on a website via a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.49  Courts routinely 
uphold clickwraps because the user has affirmatively assented by clicking “I agree.”50  Unlike 
clickwraps, browsewraps do not require express assent.51  Because a browsewrap requires no 
affirmative action other than use of the website, its validity depends on whether the user has 
actual or constructive knowledge of the terms.52  Scrollwraps appear in some online agreements, 
and require the user to scroll through the terms before the user can indicate his or her assent by 
clicking "I agree.”53  These differ from clickwraps and browsewraps because users are required 
to scroll through the terms and conditions before agreeing to them.  Sign-in-wraps notify the user 
of the existence of the website's terms of use and, instead of providing an "I agree" button, advise 
the user that he or she is agreeing to the terms of service when registering or signing up.54  As 
technology becomes more advanced, courts will need to continue to adapt to the different ways 
that contracts are formed via the internet. 
 
46 Id. at 366. 
47 6 David Bender, Computer Law § 61.05 (2018). 
48 Bender, supra note 47. 
49 Bender, supra note 47. 
50 Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 366. 
51 Bender, supra note 47. 
52 Bender, supra note 47. 
53 Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2017). 
54 Id. at 76. 
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Presently, courts have not adapted the fundamental principles of contract law to contracts 
formed through new technology.55  The basic tenets of contract law may still control, but courts 
should be wary that the bargaining power of companies that take advantage of new innovations 
in technology does not increase to such a level as to create a significant disadvantage for 
consumers.  Companies and consumers both adapt to changes in technology, but it is unclear 
whether the effects these changes have on consumers’ rights are fully understood by these 
companies, their consumers, and even by the courts.   
C. The Second Circuit Takes on Pre-dispute Arbitration Clauses in Uber Agreements 
Courts began to analyze mandatory arbitration clauses in mobile apps by reviewing how 
the terms and conditions are displayed in the app.  This analysis parallels how courts review 
physical contracts between two parties.  But the Second Circuit’s decision Meyer v. Uber Techs., 
demonstrates that courts do not always take into account the effects that these types of contracts 
may have on consumers in future disputes such as the decrease in bargaining power and the costs 
to the consumers.   
Specifically, in Meyer v. Uber Techs., the plaintiff downloaded the Uber app on his 
Samsung Galaxy S5 and took ten rides with Uber drivers in New York, Connecticut, 
Washington, D.C., and Paris.56  On behalf of a putative class of Uber riders, Meyer sued Uber 
“alleging the Uber App allowed drivers to fix prices amongst themselves, in violation of the 
Sherman Act and the Donnelly Act.”57  The district court denied Uber’s motion to compel 
 
55 Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 366. 
56 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 70. 
57 Id. at 72.  
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arbitration.58  It concluded that Meyer did not have reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms 
of Service and did not unambiguously manifest assent to the terms.59  
The Second Circuit addressed whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between 
the plaintiffs and Uber and whether defendants waived their right to enforce an agreement to 
compel arbitration.60  Looking to the Federal Arbitration Act, the district court concluded that if 
an agreement to arbitrate existed, "it should then consider whether the dispute [fell] within the 
scope of the arbitration agreement."61  In this case, the parties did not dispute that the plaintiffs’ 
claims would be covered by the arbitration provision of the Terms of Service.62  Applying 
California law based upon Uber’s principal place of business in accordance with the choice of 
law clause in the contract’s terms and conditions, the court determined that the law in California 
and New York regarding arbitration agreements was substantially similar.63  
The court then began a discussion of different web-based contracts and the varying 
ways that consumers agree to terms and conditions: clickwrap, browsewrap, scrollwraps, and 
sign-in-wraps.64  In the interface at issue in Meyer, a putative user is not required to assent 
explicitly to the contract terms; the user must instead click a button marked "Register," 
underneath which the screen states "[b]y creating an Uber account, you agree to the TERMS OF 
SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY," with hyperlinks to the Terms of Service and Privacy 
Policy.65  The hyperlink in Meyer was blue, underlined, and the font was in all capital letters.66  
The court first used an objective test to consider the perspective of a reasonably prudent 
 
58 Id. at 72. 
59 Id. at 79. 
60 Id. at 72. 
61 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74. 
62 Id at 74.  
63 Id. at 74. 
64 Id. at 75.  
65 Id. at 71. 
66 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 71. 
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smartphone user in determining the question of reasonable conspicuousness.67  It discussed the 
vast number of consumers that own smartphones and use apps that require them to enter into 
contracts with different companies on a daily basis.68  The court concluded that the design of the 
screen and the language used in Uber’s app rendered the notice provided reasonable as a matter 
of California law.69  The court reasoned that the screen containing the link to the terms was 
uncluttered, there was no scrolling required to see the link, and that it was blue and underlined 
such that it was conspicuous enough for a reasonable user.70  The Court concluded that the 
sentence that contained the link, "[b]y creating an Uber account, you agree to the TERMS OF 
SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY," was directly below the registration button, thereby implying 
that by selecting “register” a consumer agreed to the terms contained in that link.71  
The Court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs’ assent was unambiguous due to 
the ample evidence that a reasonable user would be on inquiry notice of the terms.72  "Inquiry 
notice is actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry."73  The 
spatial and temporal coupling of the terms with the registration button "indicate[d ] to the 
consumer that he or she is . . . employing such services subject to additional terms and conditions 
that may one day affect him or her.”74  Thus, the court held that the consumer was bound by the 
arbitration provision. 
D. The First Circuit Finds the Terms and Conditions Not Conspicuous Enough for a 
Reasonable User. 
 
67 Id. at 75. 
68 Id. at 77. 
69 Id. at 79. 
70 Id. at 78. 
71 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78. 
72 Id. at 78. 
73 Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012). 
74 Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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The First Circuit’s decision in Cullinane v. Uber Techs., was a win for the consumers in 
the case, but in the grand scheme, it may prove to not be as helpful as some believe.  
Specifically, in Cullinane, four plaintiffs downloaded the Uber app on their smartphones and 
registered for accounts.75  All four ordered Ubers for transportation in and around Boston76 and 
claimed that Uber unnecessarily charged them the Massport Surcharge and the East Boston toll77 
even though Massachusetts did not require such fees to be charged to Uber passengers.78  
In deciding whether to enforce Uber’s purported arbitration clause, the First Circuit 
closely analyzed the interface of Uber’s in-app registration process, providing screenshots of the 
Uber app in its opinion.79  Describing in extensive detail each page of the registration process, 
the court paid particular attention to the font color, size of any words on the page and the color of 
the background.80  The “Terms of Service & Privacy Policy” hyperlink was in bold white text 
enclosed in a gray rectangle on a black background.81  An implication of agreement preceded the 
hyperlink.82  The arbitration portion of the terms stated “[y]ou acknowledge and agree that you 
and [Uber] are each waiving the right to a trial by jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class User 
in any purported class action or representative proceeding.”83  The Court compared 
Massachusetts law with the Federal Arbitration Act which established that an agreement, written 
in a contract to settle a controversy by arbitration shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.84  
 
75 Cullinane v. Uber Techs., 893 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 2018). 
76 Id. at 55-6. 
77 Id. at 56. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 56-8. 
80 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 56-8. 
81 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 57. 
82 Id. at 57. 
83 Id. at 59. 
84 Id. at 60. 
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The Court then turned to whether a written agreement to arbitrate existed, and placed the 
burden to show this on the party seeking to compel arbitration.85  It then applied Ajemian v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., which set forth a two-step inquiry used to determine if an arbitration clause in this 
case was enforceable.86  Under this approach, the first step determines whether the contract terms 
were “reasonably communicated to the plaintiffs.”87  The second step determines whether the 
record shows those terms were accepted and, if so, the manner of acceptance.88  Uber claimed 
that “its online presentation was sufficiently conspicuous” enough “to bind the plaintiffs whether 
or not they chose to click through the relevant terms.”89  The Court looked to the definition of 
conspicuous under Massachusetts law to resolve the first step of the inquiry.90   It then concluded 
that pursuant to the Massachusetts law, “conspicuous” is defined as so “written, displayed or 
presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it.”91  
Applying this standard, the court held that the plaintiffs were not reasonably notified of the terms 
of the Agreement because Uber did not use a common method to display the terms and 
conditions.92  It found that the link was not blue and underlined as hyperlinks usually are and that 
there were many other noticeable terms on the page that diminished the conspicuousness of the 
link for the terms and conditions.93  As to the second question, the First Circuit concluded that 
“the fact that the plaintiffs were not reasonably notified of the terms of the Agreement, 
[demonstrated] they did not provide their unambiguous assent to those terms.”94 
 
85 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 60. 
86 Id. at 61-2 (citing Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 575 (May 7, 2013)). 
87 Id. at 62. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62. 
91 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62, (citing ALM GL ch. 106, § 1-201).  
92 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62. 
93 Id. at 63. 
94 Id. at 64.  
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The decisions by the First and Second Circuits that resulted in a “split”, only scratched 
the surface of the real issue at stake.  The First and Second circuits did not disagree on the 
application of a federal law as the word “split” implies.  Rather, they applied the appropriate 
state law, and based on the facts that were given, came to different conclusions.  These cases 
focused on the appearance of the Uber interface that the plaintiffs experienced and whether or 
not the links to the terms and conditions were conspicuous enough to put the plaintiffs on notice 
that they were accepting the agreement and waiving their right to a trial by jury.95  The circuit 
courts did not broach the issue of whether or not these clauses are inherently suspect or 
prejudicial towards consumers.  Perhaps, they took a narrow view of the arbitration clauses in 
these cases to avoid the issue altogether.  Referenced above, legislation in the United States 
clearly supports the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses, even in a mobile 
application agreement such as the ones used by Uber.96  Based on the facts of Meyer, it seems 
that the First Circuit would have made the same decision as the Second Circuit if Uber 
highlighted in blue instead of grey, the hyperlink that brought the user to the terms and 
conditions, and if that particular screen was less cluttered.97  Even if these facts were different 
and the court held the terms and conditions were reasonably conspicuous to the user, as 
addressed next, it still would not solve the issue of inequality between the consumer and the 
business in their “meeting of the minds.” 
 
PART III: HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS WIDENED THE GAP BETWEEN CONSUMERS 
AND BUSINESSES 
 
95 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 73; Cullinane., 893 F.3d at 62. 
96 Atalese, 99 A.3d at 312. 
97 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 64. 
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The congressional findings in the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, as well as the 
original purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, illustrate that there is a substantial need for more 
consideration of the average consumer’s knowledge and rights in pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses that appear in consumer contracts.  As previously discussed, courts have 
analyzed whether the terms and conditions are conspicuous enough to put an average consumer 
on notice of the terms and if so, whether that is enough to hold them to the arbitration clause.98  
Courts, however, have not contemplated whether consumers as a class tend to understand what 
rights they are waiving by registering for an account on an app even if the consumers know that 
they are agreeing to the terms and conditions.  Courts should instead be considering whether 
consumers fully understand that they are giving up their right to a trial, whether the company, in 
good faith, notified the consumer of such a waiver, and the bargaining power of both parties.  
These factors should be considered along with the analysis shared by both the First and Second 
Circuits.  Mobile applications such as the one created by Uber expose more consumers to 
contract agreements than any other type of consumer contract due to the frequency with which 
mobile applications are used in our daily lives.99  While it is often argued that most consumers 
actively choose not to read the terms and conditions in these mobile app agreements, whether or 
not that is true, should not be dispositive of the issue.  Just because consumers abstain from 
reading the agreements does not mean they fully understand what rights they are waiving and 
how this could affect them in the future.100  Nor should they be forced to enter into an unfair 
arbitration process.  In traditional contract law, one who signs a contract without reading it, is 
still bound by the contract.101  While that principle is reasonable between two parties that are on 
 
98 Id.  
99 Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 77 (2d Cir. 2017).  
100 CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 9. 
101 Ray v. Eurice, 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952). 
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equal footing, it becomes untenable with the introduction of technology and the way in which it 
is used by the average consumer today.  Choosing to abstain from or to waive your rights to 
something, when you do not have all of the relevant information should not lead you to be bound 
by that agreement.  Studies have shown that even when consumers read such terms and 
conditions, they still do not understand the consequences of their assent.102  “Mutual assent 
requires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they have agreed.  An 
effective waiver requires a party to have full knowledge of his legal rights and intent to surrender 
those rights.”103  The First and Second Circuits did not address the real issue: whether pre-
dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in the mobile applications are fair to the consumer and 
should be enforced. 
A. Consumers’ Understanding of Arbitration Clauses 
Today, there is an ever-increasing amount of people who buy smartphones, smart 
watches, and tablets that allow you to download mobile applications that require the consumer to 
enter into a contract in order to participate in that app’s services.104  Some examples are: Lyft, 
Venmo, Facebook, and any mobile banking app.105  As Chief Justice Roberts put it in Riley v. 
California,106  “. . . modern cell phones are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life 
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human 
anatomy.”107  Presumably because of our reliance on technology, and more specifically, our 
phones, the objective of app developers is to make the registration process as quick and seamless 
 
102 CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 9. 
103 Atalese v. U.S. Leg. Services Group, 99 A.3d 306, 313 (N.J. 2014). 
104 Meyer., 868 F.3d 66, 77 (2d Cir. 2017). 
105 LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/ (last visited May 15, 2019); VENMO, https://venmo.com/ (last visited May 15, 
2019); FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ (last visited May 15, 2019); WELLS FARGO, 
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as possible for the consumer.  The average consumer today expects these kinds of processes to 
be streamlined and efficient so that they can enjoy the app within minutes or even seconds of 
downloading it.  Uber’s novel app has changed the landscape of transportation services.  Instead 
of calling a phone number of an unfamiliar cab company, or standing on the sidewalk with your 
hand in the air as handfuls of yellow cabs drive by, you can simply order a car to come pick you 
up within minutes and usually for a reasonable rate.  This service has become so popular, other 
similar ride-sharing services such as Lyft or Via have entered the market.108 
What people may not consider, or perhaps have chosen not to care about when they take 
part in this exchange, is that they are entering into a contract to have a company provide a ride 
for you and your belongings from point A to point B, and that many different legal issues can 
arise from such a simple transaction.  “An average member of the public may not know — 
without some explanatory comment — that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one's 
claim adjudicated in a court of law.”109   
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) did a study in 2015 on arbitration 
and one section specifically focused on what consumers understand about dispute resolution 
systems specifically in credit card agreements.110  When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, it instructed the CFPB to study “the use of 
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute . . . in connection with the offering or 
providing of consumer financial products or services,” and to report their findings back to 
Congress.111  The survey explored the role of dispute resolution clauses in consumer decisions to 
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acquire credit cards and consumers’ awareness, understanding, or knowledge of their dispute 
resolution rights.112 The reason for this study, according to the CFPB, was because most “of the 
empirical work on arbitration that has been carried out has not had a consumer financial 
focus.”113  The majority of the consumers surveyed were unsure if they could sue the credit  card 
company in court when their agreements contained an arbitration clause.114  Over a third 
believed they could, knowing that their agreements contained arbitration clauses included in their 
contracts.115  The results of the survey show most consumers are not aware of what arbitration 
clauses are or whether or not they are included in their contracts.116  A lack of knowledge in our 
society on this subject is significant because of how frequently consumers are entering into these 
types of agreements.  
For example, when a person applies for a credit card, they are provided a credit card 
agreement that contains all of the provisions of the contract.  Whether or not they read this 
information is their choice, but they are still presented with the agreement and its contents.  
When registering for an account on Uber, the app simply provides a link to the terms and 
conditions.117  The registrants are unable to visualize these terms and do not fully grasp what it is 
that they are agreeing to.118  But even though the credit card applicants are able to hold the 
physical agreement in their hands, it does not make a difference.119  As the CFPB study shows, 
even the credit card applicants who received a physical contract and were aware of the existence 
of an arbitration agreement, did not fully grasp how that affected their rights.120  Even if every 
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consumer took the time to read their contracts, the CFPB study demonstrates that many of these 
consumers will still not understand to what they are agreeing.   
Holding consumers to contracts that require access to a lawyer to fully understand, would 
also put a strain on businesses that rely on daily use of their services.  This would become a 
costly and time-consuming method for business and individual consumers who are entering into 
these types of contracts on a daily basis.  This demonstrates the need for clarity and unambiguity, 
something that New Jersey is attempting to offer.  The New Jersey Supreme Court (relying on 
the New Jersey Arbitration Act, which is nearly identical to the Federal Arbitration Act) held that 
“an arbitration clause, like any contractual clause providing for the waiver of a constitutional or 
statutory right, must state its purpose clearly and unambiguously.”121  If anything is clear, it is 
that most consumers do not understand the wording of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses.  
B. State Legislation 
The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to “place arbitration agreements on an equal 
footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms.”122  Consequently, “a 
state cannot subject an arbitration agreement to more burdensome requirements than” other 
contractual provisions.123  Thus, an arbitration clause cannot be invalidated by state-law 
“defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an 
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”124  This does not mean that courts will enforce every 
arbitration clause regardless of how it is phrased.125  The Federal Arbitration Act “permits states 
to regulate ... arbitration agreements under general contract principles,” and a court may 
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invalidate an arbitration clause “‘upon such grounds as exist  at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.’”126 
Some states’ laws on their face appear to be sufficient enough to protect the average 
consumer.  But as the decision in the Second circuit demonstrates, that is not the case.  California 
law is clear that “an offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by 
inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he is unaware, contained in a document whose 
contractual nature is not obvious."127  California contract law measures assent by an objective 
standard that takes into account both what the offeree said, wrote, or did and the transactional 
context in which the offeree verbalized or acted."128  Where there is no evidence that the offeree 
had actual notice of the terms of the agreement, the offeree will still be bound by the agreement 
if a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice of the terms.129  Whether a reasonably 
prudent user would be on inquiry notice turns on the "[c]larity and conspicuousness of arbitration 
terms."130  In the context of web-based contracts, clarity and conspicuousness are a function of 
the design and content of the relevant interface.131  Only if the undisputed facts establish that 
there is "[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous 
manifestation of assent to those terms" will a court find that a contract has been formed.132 
California and Massachusetts law are similar in their analyses of the enforceability of 
web-based arbitration clauses.133  Under Massachusetts law, courts will enforce arbitration 
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clauses in web-based contracts if there is reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of 
contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers.134  These 
are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.135  Massachusetts law 
uses the objective standard to determine if the terms are conspicuous to a reasonable person.136 
Despite the split in the circuit courts’ decisions, the cases highlight the fact that two different 
states may have the same standards, but the facts of each case are highly relevant.    
Unlike Massachusetts or California law, New Jersey law focuses not only on whether or 
not the terms and conditions were conspicuous enough for the user, but also on whether the 
provisions are sufficiently clear to place a consumer on notice that he or she is waiving a 
constitutional or statutory right.137  In fact, under New Jersey law, this rule is not specific to 
arbitration clauses, but to any contractual “waiver-of-rights provision.”138  The Court requires 
that such provisions “reflect that [the party] has agreed clearly and unambiguously to its 
terms.”139  The objective of this approach “is to assure that the parties know that in electing 
arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue.”140  For 
example, in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., the New Jersey Supreme Court 
invalidated an arbitration clause because “nowhere in the arbitration clause [was] there any 
explanation that plaintiff is waiv[ed] her right to seek relief in court for a breach of her statutory 
rights.”141  The provision in that case “[did] not explain what arbitration is, nor [did] it indicate 
how arbitration is different from a proceeding in a court of law.  Nor [was] it written in plain 
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language that would be clear and understandable to the average consumer that she is waiving 
statutory rights.”142  All predispute mandatory arbitration clauses trigger unequal bargaining 
power and uninformed consent issues.143  
Instead of allowing these issues to continue, states should elevate the requirements of the 
conspicuousness of a corporation’s terms and conditions in mobile applications.  The high rate at 
which smartphone users download and partake in mobile application services daily, and the 
growing trend of streamlined registration processes emphasize the need for more consumer 
protection when agreeing to a company’s terms and conditions.144  It is a basic principle in 
contract law that “absent fraud, duress or mutual mistake, that one having the capacity to 
understand a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to 
him, signs it, is bound by his signature in law, at least.”145  States need to adapt their contract 
laws to the technological advances of today’s world.  One way in which terms and conditions of 
web-based or mobile application contracts can be written more fairly for consumers is to have 
the requirement of specific assent to all clauses that result in the waiver of rights in clickwrap 
agreements.146   
For example, consistent with this approach, one commentator has highlighted the fact that 
“[w]rap contracts contain blanket assent, the all-or-nothing provision in which the contract is 
formed entirely if there is an opportunity to read.”  However, in [her] proposal, for each rights-
foreclosure provision, the non-drafting party must click "I agree."147  Consumers would then 
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have more of an opportunity to see the specific provision that waives their rights before they 
agree to it.148  This proposal could be implemented into the terms and conditions that users must 
agree to when registering for an account on the Uber App.  Uber and other similar businesses 
would also be less inclined to insert any unconscionable terms into the agreement.149 This active 
participation on the consumer’s part is beneficial for those businesses as well.150  Indeed, review 
by the consumers of each rights-foreclosure provision would create more certainty that 
consumers actually agreed to the terms and are therefore bound by them.151  As a result, this 
could save Uber money in dealing with lengthy litigation over whether or not the contract is 
enforceable.152  Even if Uber is allowed to prohibit users from registering if they do not agree to 
the specific arbitration provision, then at least the user is now aware of what right they are giving 
up if they decide to agree.  At first, most people will probably agree in order to obtain the 
convenient service that they offer.  But as more and more consumers are faced with this dilemma 
of whether to waive their right to a trial for the convenience of the app, it will force companies 
like Uber to change their policies in order to compete.  
Applying the approach used by the Court in Atalese regarding the clarity of the 
arbitration clause, the arbitration provisions in Uber’s agreement should clearly define 
arbitration, how it is different from a trial in a court of law, and what right is being waived.153  
This way, the consumer is automatically brought to the arbitration clause when registering, 
required to agree to this clause specifically before registration is complete, and will be able to 
better understand what they are agreeing to at the time they agree to it and not after a dispute 
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arises.  This idea would require the consumer to spend more time on the registration process, but 
given the demand for ride-share services, it is hard to imagine that this would deter many people 
from signing up for an account.  Admittedly, there are many different aspects of an arbitration 
clause, which are reflected in Uber’s terms and conditions.154 Currently, the Uber App arbitration 
clause starts with this section highlighted in bold font unlike the rest of the agreement: 
By agreeing to the Terms, you agree that you are required to resolve any claim that you 
may have against Uber on an individual basis in arbitration, as set forth in this Arbitration 
Agreement. This will preclude you from bringing any class, collective, or representative 
action against Uber, and also preclude you from participating in or recovering relief 
under any current or future class, collective, consolidated, or representative action 
brought against Uber by someone else.155 
 
Underneath this conspicuous section are many more provisions regarding arbitration.156  This 
bold section referenced above would be a fitting place for Uber to require the registrant go, to 
specifically agree to these terms.  If Uber were to follow the approach set forth in Atalese, they 
could use the above section to delineate in simple terms what arbitration means, how it is 
different from a trial in a court of law, and what right is being waived.157  An enforceable 
arbitration agreement “at least in some general and sufficiently broad way, must explain that [a] 
plaintiff is giving up her right to bring her claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute.”158 
The CFPB study underscores the fact that even though there are thousands of people who 
may enter into contracts with credit card companies, a majority of people will choose not to 
litigate over incorrect fees or other wrongs committed by the companies.159  Corporations impose 
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in order to avoid the costs of frequent and lengthy 
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trials.160  The reality is, however, that most consumers share this goal.  To avoid going to trial 
many would rather accept the incorrect fee or just cancel their account.161  Taking into account 
the demand for Uber rides and the fact that Uber provides 15 million rides per day to 75 million 
users, adding the specific-assent proposal with clear, unambiguous language to Uber’s user 
agreement would not be such an inconvenience to new Uber users that they would not sign up 
for an account.  It may cost Uber money to implement this change to their interface, but it would 
also potentially save them the time and energy of having to defend cases like Meyer or Cullinane 
in court because more consumers would be aware of the procedure. 
C. Consumer Protection Laws Abroad 
The European Union (EU) is much more strict when it comes to these pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration clauses and offers a potential model here.162  In 1993, the EU passed the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) because advancements in technology generated a 
pervasiveness of unfair practices in non-negotiated contracts.163  The EU came to the realization 
that these non-negotiable standard-form contract provisions needed to be regulated otherwise 
there would be abuses.164  The UCTD works to render a contract “unenforceable if the terms (1) 
are non-negotiable, (2) create significant imbalance between the rights of the parties, and (3) that 
imbalance is contrary to good faith.”165  Certain clauses are “presumed to be unfair because they 
unreasonably shift risk to the consumer.”166  Among many clauses that are blacklisted whenever 
they appear as non-negotiable are browsewrap or clickwrap contract formation and pre-dispute 
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mandatory arbitration.167  If a business based in the United States offers a product or service in 
the EU, they must alter their contracts in order to comply with the stricter consumer protection 
laws.168  According to their website, Uber operates in 144 cities in Europe.169  While not all of 
these are necessarily in the EU, there are still numerous cities in the EU in which Uber operates. 
This means that if Uber does not adjust their clauses, then they are in noncompliance with the 
UCTD and their existing clauses are potentially subject to invalidation if challenged .  
Besides blacklisting certain provisions, the UCTD also provides that contract terms must 
be “drafted in plain and intelligible language, and states that ambiguities shall be interpreted in 
favor of consumers."170  This legislation has improved “the balance between consumers and 
businesses” and has also deterred businesses “from utilizing their superior bargaining power in a 
manner that oppresses parties who lack such power.”171  The EU places and emphasis on striking 
a balance between consumers and businesses because it believes that businesses should act in 
good faith when dealing with consumers and non-negotiable contract terms can lead to abuses.172 
Other members of the EU have executed laws that are even more protective of consumers 
than the UCTD.173  Arbitration clauses in the United Kingdom are presumed to be prejudicial “if 
the amount at issue is less than £ 5000.”174  Arbitration clauses in general are completely 
prohibited in France when they are employed in domestic disputes such as divorce or custody 
issues.175  In Sweden, arbitration clauses in contracts for “the sale of goods and services for 
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private use” are generally prohibited.176  “Germany won’t enforce a consumer arbitration clause 
unless it is in a separate, signed document or part of a fully notarized contract.”177  
The Canadian government has also taken steps to provide more protection for their 
citizens when dealing with pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses.178  In Ontario, you are not 
bound by “clauses to a contract that say that you must use a private arbitration process to resolve 
complaints instead of going to court or seeking assistance from the Ministry of Government and 
Consumer Services . . . even if you have accepted the agreement.”179  Similarly, there is a 
Consumer Protection Act in Quebec that states,  
[a]ny stipulation that obliges the consumer to refer a dispute to arbitration, that 
restricts the consumer’s right to go before a court, in particular by prohibiting the 
consumer from bringing a class action, or that deprives the consumer of the right to 
be a member of a group bringing a class action is prohibited.180  
 
The consumer may agree to go to arbitration if a dispute occurs after the contract has been 
entered into, but they cannot be forced to do so.181 
 Arbitration clauses used by companies such as Uber have a legitimate purpose and the 
advantages of their use are compelling enough to allow these companies to use them. The cost 
and length of litigation can be onerous, especially when a company’s product is used as 
frequently as Uber’s.  The act of eliminating arbitration clauses altogether may benefit 
consumers greatly, but it would also place a huge burden on companies to deal with costly and 
time-consuming litigation that could result in a significant depletion of their resources. Though 
many countries have done away with arbitration clauses, others have simply increased their 
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consumer protection, while still allowing these clauses to exist in certain situations discussed 
above. At the very least, The United States needs to follow suit and increase consumer protection 
when it comes to arbitration clauses.  More transparency about what rights the consumers are 
waiving as well as a more conspicuous agreement will greatly improve consumer protection. 
 
PART IV: CONCLUSION 
As scholars have begun to recognize, the gap between consumer contracts and contract 
law is causing consumer contracts to become predominantly more one-sided, unreadable, 
unnoticeable, and more favorable to businesses.182  As technology continues to advance and the 
human race becomes more and more reliant on it to serve us in our daily lives, this gap will only 
continue to grow.  Referenced earlier, “businesses would [] benefit from clear standards 
regarding contract presentation and what is considered unconscionable.”183  The courts need to 
move away from interpreting whether the terms and conditions are accessible and easily 
discoverable to the average consumer.  They should move towards a more beneficial test that 
places emphasis not only on the average consumer’s ability to comprehend the magnitude and 
the consequences of the contracts into which they are entering on a frequent basis but also on 
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